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Abstract. The answer to the fine-tuning problem of the universe has been traditionally sought in terms of 
either design or multiverse. In philosophy circles, this is sometimes expanded by adding the option of 
explanatory nihilism – the claim that there is no explanation for statements of that high level of generality: 
fine-tunings are brute facts. In this paper, we consider the fourth option which, at least in principle, is available 
to us: co-evolution of the universe and obsevers. Although conceptual roots of this approach could be found 
already in ancient stoicism, it is still the least investigated explanatory option for resolving the problem of 
empirical fine tunings. We offer two preliminary models along which the co-evolution hypothesis could be 
developed further. They are still on the level of speculative metaphysics, but there are opportunities along the 
way to generate predictions which are in principle testable, especially in the domain of large-scale numerical 
simulations.  
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The next great era of awakening of human intellect may well produce a method of 
understanding the qualitative content of equations. Today we cannot. Today we 
cannot see that the water flow equations contain such things as the barber pole 
structure of turbulence that one sees between rotating cylinders. Today we cannot 
see whether Schrödinger’s equation contains frogs, musical composers, or 
morality—or whether it does not. We cannot say whether something beyond it like 
God is needed, or not. And so we can all hold strong opinions either way. 
Richard Feynman, Lectures on Physics II, 41-12 
1. Introduction: the problem of fine-tunings apart from the design and 
the multiverse 
It is an empirical fact that physical constants and cosmological parameters of our universe are fine-
tuned to enable habitability, abiogenesis, and emergence of observers like us.3 In contrast to 
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numerous mystifications, obfuscations and confusions, this epistemic status of fine-tunings is entirely 
uncontroversial: fine tunings are empirical facts. A small change in several of the dimensionless 
fundamental physical constants or cosmological parameters would make the universe radically 
different and uninhabitable; empirically, we are here, hence the universe is in fact habitable, hence 
those constants and parameters are confined to small intervals of values, much smaller – even 
infinitely smaller in some cases – than the interval in which they could a priori be. For instance, “a 
change of more than 0.5% in the strength of the strong interaction or more than 4% change in the 
strength of the Coulomb force would destroy either nearly all C or all O in every star” (Oberhummer, 
Csoto, and Schlattl 2000, p. 90). Since all forms of life we know so far depend crucially on both 
carbon and oxygen been created in previous generations of stars, the universe with the coupling 
constants for strong or electromagnetic interaction off by a few percent would not be habitable. And 
yet, there is no reason known to science thus far why these couplings could not, in principle, be 
different by million percent from their observed values.   
What is controversial, however, is (i) whether there is an explanation of fine-tunings, (ii) whether it is 
worth searching for such an explanation, and (iii) if the answer to (i) and (ii) is affirmative, what is the 
best explanatory hypothesis for the explanandum of fine-tunings. Usually one starts from the 
outcome, namely from two famous explanatory hypotheses – or, more precisely, two classes of 
hypotheses – the Design Hypothesis and the Multiverse Hypothesis.4 These are the two most 
elaborate explanatory paradigms for fine-tunings. Either the observable universe was designed by 
natural or supernatural agency to be habitable and friendly to observers – or it is just a minuscule 
part of a much larger whole, the multiverse, which is consistent with all pre-requisites for our 
existence as observers.  
It is worth a moment, however, to backtrack a bit and ask about further explanatory possibilities. 
Scientists and philosophers skeptical (for various and often conflicting reasons) about extravagant 
metaphysical claims of both Design and Multiverse hypotheses occassionally reject the idea that 
statements of such generality as those expressing values of fundamental physical constants and 
cosmological parameters have causal explanation in the first place. Instead, we shall hear from time 
to time, they are brute facts. Consequently, searching for their explanation – and other aspects of the 
initial conditions of the universe – is fruitless waste of time and energy (e.g., Callender 2004; 
Mosterín 2005). Still more sophisticated sub-branch of this view argues that the request for 
explanation is illegitimate, since there is no well-defined explanandum (Manson 2000; McGrew, 
McGrew, & Vestrup 2001). This explanatory nihilism, provoked partly no doubt by the extravagancy 
of both Design and Multiverse, represents perhaps the “silent majority” view among scientists and 
philosophers. It seems common-sensical to acknowledge that there are questions “too big to 
answer”, or at least too big from the point of view of cost-benefit analysis.   
(From time to time, explanatory nihilism is interpreted as saying that the universe is habitable 
through dumb luck, like a coin landing heads a hundred times in a row. We know that there are 
occurences in everyday life – and occasionally in science as well – which occur due to dumb luck; 
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serendipitous discoveries such as radioactivity, penicillin, or the cosmic microwave background are 
sometimes described in this manner. In the cosmological case, however, this is simply inapplicable, 
for the following reason. Consecutive coin tosses, whose outcomes constitute what we would 
describe as lucky accident, need to be real, physical events, not abstract possibilities; in the 
cosmological case, we would need multiple instantiations of “the universe” – which would then lead 
us to the multiverse hypothesis, rather than to the explanatory nihilism. It is of no consequence 
whether multiple universes are co-existing in some higher-dimensional superstructure or they for a 
temporal sequence, as in the old scenario of oscillating universe. Observational selection within a 
multiverse would in any such case take care of the fine tuning, and we would need to worry “only” 
about the physical mechanism for generating the ensemble of universes.) 
More serious consideration shows, however, conceptual and practical bankruptcy of explanatory 
nihilism. For starters, the history of science clearly shows that, for instance, the question of whether 
Sun revolves around the Earth or vice versa was for very long time also considered “too big” or even 
“metaphysical” question which mortals could not hope to ever answer. So, for example, great 
medieval Islamic astronomers like Abu Rayḥan Al-Biruni and Nasir al-Din Tusi were clearly aware of 
both geocentric and heliocentric systems, but expressed opinion that the issue is too complex to be 
ever entirely settled. Even more, delving into such matters was once considered pretentious, 
impertinent, or even sacrilegious. There are many other historical instances in which similar 
ignorabimus has eventually been shown to be unnecessary and unfounded.  
This same debate has been led more than once in the history of physical cosmology, especially during 
the “Great Controversy” between the Big Bang and the steady-state theories of the expanding 
universe in the 1948-1965 period (Kragh 1996). As the distinguished cosmologist William Bonnor 
wrote:5 
It is the business of science to offer rational explanations for all the events in the real world, and any 
scientist who calls on God to explain something is falling down on his job. This applies as much to the 
start of the expansion as to any other event. If the explanation is not forthcoming at once, the 
scientist must suspend judgment: but if he is worth his salt he will always maintain that a rational 
explanation will essentially be found.   
Further, explanatory nihilism is irritable due to attempts to assign an aura of “deep” philosophical 
sophistication to our ignorance. Neither Callender nor Mosterin nor any other supporter of 
explanatory nihilism would suggest that the question Why does the stairway in your house consist of 
exactly 16 steps? requires answering in terms of brute facts. It is likely that they would quote causes 
connected with principles of masonry, efficiency, standards, height of an average person, etc. There 
is no “suspension of judgement” on such issues. However, to answer the question Why is the level of 
primary fluctuations in the cosmic microwave background 10-5? (cf., Tegmark & Rees 1998) it is 
tempting to invoke brute facts, suspension of judgement, and impossibility of causal explanation. Is it 
only because we tacitly assume to know more about masonry than about cosmology?  
Alleged simplicity of explanatory nihilism is indeed quite misleading, since its proponents do not list 
the statements claiming to be irreducible and inexplicable brute facts. But such a list must exist, by 
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definition, if explanatory nihilism is to be a coherent doctrine. We can assume that the list contains 
statements like, for example, the following: 
Pk: Initial conditions at the Big Bang were such that the dark energy cosmological density fraction  
today is neither less than -5 nor greater than 5.6 
This statement cannot, on the present level of understanding of fundamental physics and cosmology, 
be explained by any other statement or a set of statements. The same, however, can be said about 
the following statement:  
Pm: Initial conditions at Earth's crust formation 4,556 million years before present were such that the 
number of continents of Earth today is neither less than 2 nor greater than 18.  
Why this statement is not a brute fact? Are Pk and Pm really that different? If yes, what exactly makes 
them different? Are proponents of explanatory nihilism ready to recommend to geo-scientists to 
treat statements like Pm as brute facts? And are they ready to do so with the same nonchalance they 
apply to cosmologists in the case of statements like Pk? Finally, if the answer to the last two 
questions are affirmative, does that mean that we need to deal with large number of brute facts, 
surfacing in almost any scientific discipline? In our view, this is almost a reductio of the nihilist 
doctrine: many brute facts mean, rather, that we are too lazy to dig for explanations deep enough.  
Finally, explanatory nihilism has one essential methodological demerit – which some proponents 
seemingly deem a merit instead (in particular, see Mosterín 2005) – namely that we can always 
return to it, if other directions of research and other explanatory schemes fail. This a posteriori 
adaptiveness has long ago (about the time of Democritus’ and Epicurus’ atomism) stopped being a 
virtue and is now more a burden for its proponents. 
On the other hand, if we renounce explanatory nihilism (at least for a time being, while exploring 
other options), is it necessary to accept the Design or the Multiverse? The answer is no, since we 
have a fourth option, which is what we dub coevolution of universe and observers.7 It is much less 
developed and discussed than the rest of the field, but there are multiple reasons why those 
dissatisfied with both Design and the Multiverse might wish to investigate it. The core idea of 
coevolution is based upon an extrapolation of process metaphysics: if we perceive a correlation 
between the two outcomes (in this case the large-scale properties of the universe and our properties 
as observers) we should investigate whether there are correlations in processes leading to those 
outcomes (cosmological evolution vs. biological evolution and noogenesis). It is only reasonable to 
expect hidden correlations between parameters describing/governing these processes. In the most 
extreme version, we could ask whether it is one and the same underlying process.8 In this sense we  
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use the locution “coevolution”: two correlated processes which involve strong and repeated 
interactions or, alternatively, a single fundamental process which has two manifestation within a 
well-defined domain of space, time, and energy. It is not as if we could assert causal primacy of one 
process over another, no matter how close our biased viewpoint were to one of them.  
Obviously, this understanding of coevolution is sufficiently similar to the strict definition of 
coevolution within classical biology: reciprocal evolutionary change in the interacting species (e.g., 
Thompson 1994). The main difference lies in historical fact that in the practice of biology (and most 
of the philosophy of biology) species are the central entities, whose characters present relevant 
explanandums. If we abandon species-centric perspective in favor of the perspective emphasizing the 
process and mechanisms of evolution – which bring about observed species and their specific 
characters as current and temporary outcomes – we shall obtain a similar coevolutionary concept.  
Among a small number of thinkers who entertained coevolutionary thinking in the context of 
fundamental physics and cosmology, the key role belongs to the great physicist, philosopher, and 
science teacher John Archibald Wheeler. Wheeler's version of the co-evolution hypothesis was based 
on a specific subjectivist reading of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
On this reading, collapse of wavefunction occurs only through interaction with an observer (Wheeler 
1975, 1977; Stapp 2007). Remembering Bohr's insistence on separation between micro- and macro-
level of description, the question what exactly is necessary for macroscopic description to be valid is 
entirely legitimate. If the answer contains (at least) an observer, it follows that emergence of the 
macroscopis description cannot be separated from the issue of evolution of observers in general. In 
other words, we cannot limit ourselves to a narrow class of quantum experiments (Stern-Gerlach, 
spectroscopic data, electron diffraction, and such things to which the quantum measurement 
problem is conventionally applied), but to much wider physical and biological reality around us. We 
have to involve the evolutionary background of observers, including for instance presence and 
properties of the Earth, the Solar System, the Milky Way, and everything else we usually think of as 
prerequisites for the emergence of life and intelligence (on Earth). Therefore, according to Wheeler's 
conception of the participatory anthropic principle, instead of a causal series, we deal with a 
feedback loop which links concrete physical reality and observers. Concrete physical reality here 
means the collapsed wavefunction, in contrast to the unitary evolving superposition of states. 
Instead of the universal, non-collapsed network of all physically possible outcomes, including both 
dead and alive Schrödinger's cat, the interaction with an observer (which we conventionally dub “the 
measurement”) produces concrete individual outcomes constituting the classical world we see 
around us.9 Since the world around us is, as far as we can observe, a collection of concrete outcomes 
and not quantum superpositions, Wheeler found it a sufficient justification for the following general 
statement.  
: Observers are necessary to bring universe into being. 
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In Wheeler's other words:10 
Quantum mechanics has led us to take seriously and explore the directly opposite [to classical 
reductionism] view that the observer is as essential to the creation of the universe as the universe is 
to the creation of the observer. 
Note that this has prima facie nothing to do with fine tunings of the universe. In order to establish 
the link, we need an implicit assumption of self-consistency: the universe being brought into being is 
compatible with the particular sort of observers which are bringing it into being. While this may seem 
obvious, it does raise interesting questions like: what different sorts of observers are there? Can 
different sorts of observers be meaningfully said to inhabit the same universe? etc. We do not intend 
to argue that these questions necessarily present difficulties for the Wheelerian project; further 
careful philosophical analysis would be required for that. 
Wheeler's approach through the participatory anthropic principle is not, however, the only way to 
elaborate and model co-evolutionary hypothesis for explanation of empirical fine tunings. In a 
general metaphysical context, other versions are conceivable, two of which will be outlined in the 
rest of this paper. They are intentionally formulated in such a way to be both syntaxically and 
semantically in contrast to the prevailing narratives of modern philosophy of physics and cosmology. 
In reflecting upon them, we are guided by two general themes. The first theme is our Popperian 
contention that provocation is a promising path to critical insights. The second theme is well-known 
historical scenario: a naive metaphysical speculation leading to more precise, and ultimately 
empirically falsifiable predictions of physical theory; it happened quite a few times on the record.  
 
2. Coevolution hypothesis: an endosymbiotic model 
In which manner could the universe and cognitive processes within it coevolve? An attempt to 
answer this question includes exploring of other examples of coevolution known from our empirical 
databases and drawing some analogies. Each such example is, of course, part of the physical universe 
– so that, if we accept coevolution as the explanation for fine tuning, they would be instances of 
double coevolution; of course, this does not influence their heuristic value. 
The most obvious example in this sense is the endosymbiotic theory of the origin of eukaryotic cell in 
evolutionary biology and microbiology. From the early days of evolutionary theory, and especially 
since the establishment of the Tree of Life containing both prokaryotes and eukaryotes, the puzzle of 
the huge structural difference between a prokaryote cell – for instance, a bacterium – and an 
eukaryote cell – for instance, a neuron or a trombocite – was looming large. A bacterial cell is small 
and diffuse, while in the eukaryote cell we find multiple levels of organelle structure. Organelles, 
such as nuclei, vacuoles, mitochondria, possess complex internal structure and are exchanging 
energy and information with their environment through their membranes. Obviously, prokaryote 
cells originated first – and they have been extremely well-adapted to practically all terrestrial 
environments throughout the history of life (e.g., Gould 1996). Such superb bacterial adaptation 
immediately makes the question about the origin of eukaryotes much more difficult. In the 
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memorable words of Isidore Rabi, who ordered that? What kind of selection pressure might have 
caused such a quantum leap in complexity – and fragility?  
For quite a long time, there was no coherent idea about that – to a large degree due to the fact that 
the boundary is so sharp and there are no transitional forms between prokaryotes and eukaryotes. It 
is a true discrete step, one of the “major transitions” in evolution (Maynard Smith & Szathmary 
1997). To explain it, a revolutionary change in our thinking about the very concepts was required – 
the approach which is the endosymbiotic theory. In its modern form, it has been formulated in the 
seminal study of Lynn Margulis (then Sagan) in 1967.11  In a simplified form, the endosymbiotic 
theory suggests that prokaryotes which for a very long time lived in the same ecosystem first 
developed symbiosis, and subsequently began to live one within another for reasons of efficiency of 
resource processing and metabolism. In the evolutionary deep time, one symbiont became the 
eukaryiotic cell, and others became its organelles. This opened a new, previously inaccessible part of 
the overall biological morphospace for further evolution – the huge biological complexity we observe 
today in Earth’s biosphere is a consequence of that simple “trickery” of endosymbiosis. The 
endosymbiotic theory not only explains the origin of organelles within the eukaryotic cell, but also 
some  aspects of their structure (internal membranes, for instance) and their functional 
specialization. Its most famous prediction, the existence of relict DNA within present-day organelles 
like mitochondria or citoplasts as characteristic “fossil” of the epoch of their separate living, has been 
triumphantly confirmed many decades after the original study of Margulis (e.g., McFadden 2001; 
Kutschera & Niklas 2005).  
Can the universe look like that? More precisely, can investigation of all possible functional 
dependencies lead to the solution of the problem of arising complexity through the emergence of 
observers? As long as we stay in the firm embrace of mechanistic reductionism, such a thing sounds 
nonsensical – at best – just as the proverbial putting the cart before the horse. It is an expression of 
our prejudices, however, since there is in fact nothing inherently bad in putting the cart before the 
horse as long as we don't have additional insights into wider context: dynamics of motion of carts 
and horses, requirements of anatomy and of traffic. One should mention that during the late 19th 
and early 20th century there were multiple experiments, especially in France, with carts which 
indeed were placed in front of the horse, i.e., pushed by horses. Thus, for instance, Windsor (1907): 
The very latest Paris novelty in the vehicle line is a four-wheeled surrey in which the cart is actually 
before the horse… This 1-hp motor starts and stops on command, and has two speeds forward; the 
machine is not constructed to reverse. No lines are used, the conveyance being directed by means of 
a steering wheel. The outfit has not yet been arrested for fast driving. 
Although such contraptions never became widely accepted or popular, that contingent fact of history 
only proved their impracticality, not that they were logically impossible, nor indeed technically 
unfeasible. An analogous argument should be, on the present level of cosmological understanding, 
sufficient for establishing legitimacy of coevolutionary approach to explanation of empirical fine 
tunings. We need to investigate many specific details of the hypothesis before concluding that it is 
impossible or unfeasible.  
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Therefore, significant amount of additional information is necessary before we decide whether such 
a radical hypothesis is indeed in conflict with scientific methodology – or only in conflict with our 
naive and intuitive prejudices how explanatory hypotheses should look like. It is uncontroversial that, 
due to our inability to sample outside of our past light cone (nor indeed in many regions of our past 
light cone due to physical constraints), we cannot observe the whole of the hypothetical 
cosmological endosymbiosis. Instead, we are facing a series of partial insights into the underlying 
evolutionary processes and partial insight often leads into difficulties when the underlying functional 
importance needs to be assessed. In evolutionary biology, the usual task is to reconstruct 
phylogenetic origin of a character on the basis of its functional properties; here we face more difficult 
forensic issue – how to reconstruct the underlying process on the basis of chunks and bits of 
empirical data on the universe as well as on the cognitive system, although those chunks and bits in 
themselves do not carry functional importance. For example, we observe Lyman- absorption line 
systems in spectra of distant quasi-stellar objects (QSOs), but apart from very general properties of 
our perception required, there is no discernible relationship between their properties and properties 
of human cognition. The latter relationship, however, could be entirely sensible in the context of 
process metaphysics and the coevolutionary hypotheses, since by observing distant QSOs we observe 
distant past of the universe in which there were fewer (if any) observers and the cognition was 
certainly rarer and weaker in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Therefore, the “requirements” 
for fine tunings might have been weaker.    
There is an ancient organicist tradition which have had some similar aspects to the endosymbiotic 
model. It could be found in stoicism, finely put for instance by Marcus Aurelius:12 
Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one substance and one soul; and observe 
how all things have reference to one perception, the perception of this one living being; and how all 
things act with one movement; and how all things are the cooperating causes of all things which 
exist; observe too the continuous spinning of the thread and the contexture of the web.  
While we think about those symbiots becoming “mere” organelles in the eukaryotic cell as losing 
their identity in the process, this is not necessarily so and it hints more to the limits of the biological 
analogy than to additional insight into the ideas of cosmological coevolution. Instead, we can follow 
the stoics (and many subsequent organicists) into allowing the constituents to not only retain, but 
strengthen their concrete identities in the course of the evolutionary process.    
Predictions which could be drawn from this coevolutionary model might be as follows. We need finer 
grading – or a continuum – of cognition within “non-living” as well as the “living” matter; this is in 
agreement with the “extended mind” ideas within recent philosophy of mind). We should expect 
algorithmic complexity, and in particular information capacity, to increase with passage of cosmic 
time in both living and non-living systems. This would be analogous to the prediction of the 
mitochondrial DNA in the original endosymbiotic theory.  
 
                                                          
12
 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, book 4, translated by George Long (available online at 
http://classics.mit.edu//Antoninus/meditations.html, last accessed August 15, 2016). 
  
9 
3. Coevolutionary hypothesis: closed timelike curves 
Alternatively, let us try to imagine some of the future achievements of advanced cognition, in a 
distant epoch in which a large fraction – or perhaps most – of the physical universe is under control 
of intelligent species. If our experience so far tells us that the last part of the history of the universe is 
characterized by expansion of the influence of advanced cognition on its biological and physical 
environment, then we are entitled to ask: what could be long-term consequences of such a trend 
continuing? One of the possibilities is the use of closed timelike curves to influence the “past”13 and 
the universe made even more amenable to life and intelligence. Since Kurt Gödel first showed that 
closed timelike curves are, under particular conditions, acceptable within general relativity  (Gödel 
1949), numerous studies have shown that it is possible, in principle, to have local closed timelike 
curves with adequate local boundary conditions, essentially decoupled from the overall geometry 
and topology of the universe. This open the road to creating such curves by intentional means, the 
true „spacetime engineering“. If we accept this possibility, it is acceptable that intelligent beings will, 
in the fullness of time, indeed perform such engineering feats; from a plethora of possibilities offered 
by closed timelike curves, hardly anything is more interesting than intervening in the early epochs of 
the universe to make it more conductive to high complexity and advanced cognition. Of course, 
everything related to the closed timelike curves is bound to be highly speculative, since the causal 
structure of spacetimes containing them is bound to be extremely complex and counterintuitive; for 
some of the stranger philosophical aspects of such spacetimes see Richmond (2003, 2004) and 
references therein. 
This would be analogous to the original Omega-point theory of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, just 
without  its obvious theological baggage (de Chardin 1975). The idea here is that the Omega-point 
formation in distant future is not only a concrete future event which requires a particular state-of-
affairs, possible only with further advance of intelligence and technology. Far more than that: the 
emergence of an Omega-point analog means reaching maximal complexity of human cognition, 
joining with divine omniscience and standing outside of the perceived flow of time. This last point, 
stepping into eternity will, according to Teilhard's scenario, enable co-presence of the Omega-point 
in all previous moments of world's history, including the early epochs before the advent of human 
species, before the formation of Earth and indeed before any life or cognition was possible. In a 
cartoonish simplification, Teilhardian deity evolves in distant future in order to reach back into every 
moment of time, including those decisive for its own evolution.  
A modernized version has been offered by Tipler (1994) within a framework of  topologically closed, 
finite universe which satisfies precise boundary conditions. Tipler's hypothesis is philosophically and 
even theologically interesting (e.g., Birtel 1995) even if it can be considered falsified after the 
discovery of large dark energy in 1998. Simply speaking, recollapsing Friedman model required by 
Tipler is inconsistent with both the age and the physical composition of the universe in the new 
standard cosmology (for an introduction, see Liddle 2015). Philosophical interest for Tipler's 
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hypothesis is similar to the one for the steady-state cosmology of Bondi, Gold, and Hoyle from 1940s: 
it might help us clarify some of the most basic ideas of cosmology and metaphysics, likely to be found 
in many other places as well.14 On the other hand, instead of the Omega-point, we can today 
envision advanced technological singularity (e.g., Chalmers 2010), which anyway can represent an 
attractor in the space of all evolutionary trajectories of intelligent beings. In such a manner, it is 
possible at least in principle to remove supernaturalistic elements from the Teilhardian picture.  
This model has also been prefigured by Wheeler, who understood, even in the early days of modern 
precision cosmology that the future of universes containing life and intelligence is essentially 
different from the future of universes devoid of such forms of complex organization of matter. 
Universal cosmic evolution proceeds, in a sense, through the emergence of complexity corresponding 
to intelligent observers and their civilizations. Even if we today can perceive only the smallest and 
most limited and local forms of the process, it is still no less real in the fullness of time (Wheeler 
1988, p. 6): 
Minuscule though the part is today that such acts of observer-participancy play in the scheme of 
things, there are billions of years to come. There are billions upon billions of living places yet to be 
inhabited. The coming explosion of life opens the door to an all-encompassing role for observer-
participancy: to build, in time to come, no minor part of what we call its past—our past, present and 
future—but this whole vast world. 
Obviously, most of discussions of place and long-term future of intelligent observers in the universe 
rely on some assumptions pertaining to the relevant motivations and capacities of intelligent 
communities. The present metaphysical theme, therefore, intertwines with both physical 
eschatology and SETI studies (as noted recently by several thinkers, notably Vidal [2010, 2014], 
Gardner [2007], and Stewart [2010]). This is a further instance of the “properly” scientific aspect of 
an age-old metaphysical reflection.  
Basic common ingredient of these ideas is the “return into the past”, joining our subjective past and 
future into the single entangled network of causes and consequences, from which habitability of our 
universe emerges. This habitability is manifested, of course, through the empirical fine tunings. 
Closed timelike curves are here mostly as a “vehicle” to achieve the desired aim; of course, the 
existence of such “aim” is a teleological element, but as Paul Davies correctly emphasizes, something 
which is “akin to teleology” cannot be avoided if we wish to have a real alternative to the multiverse 
hypothesis (Davies 2007). The complexity of any situation featuring closed timelike curves requires a 
kind of advanced information processing which will, hopefully, be achieved in human or posthuman 
future.15 Of course, even if humanity becomes extinct, another intelligent species based on the same 
physical laws of our universe could play the very same role. One should not forget that entirely 
                                                          
14
 Interestingly enough, Sir Fred Hoyle was in his later work, quite interested in the possibility of backward 
causation, as testified by the discussion in his Intelligent Universe (Hoyle 1983, esp. pp. 211-239). We are 
grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing our attention to this fascinating piece of history. 
15
 Extreme complexity introduced by closed timelike curves even in previously quite simple everyday situations 
has been brilliantly demonstrated by the superb thriler of Shane Carruth Primer (Carruth 2004). This movie also 
highlights another possible way of falsifying the present hypothesis: if artificially created closed timelike curves 
cannot reach further into the past than the moment of their creation, it is impossible to use them for increasing 
habitability of the universe. 
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legitimate, even conservative, explanatory hypotheses within philosophy of time occasionally  
postulate divergent information processing powers, at least in principle (e.g., Arsenijevid 1986). 
 
4. Simulations and coevolution 
So, suppose that the challenge is accepted, and coevolution is accepted as a viable explanatory 
hypothesis (or a category of hypotheses), on a par with the design and the multiverse. What do we 
do next? How can we proceed to elaborate more on the hypothesis and offer specific predictions? In 
other words, how do we bridge over the gap separating metaphysics from physics in instrumental 
terms?  
We suggest that the best long-term possibility lies with numerical simulations of coevolutionary 
models. In a manner similar to the experiments in artificial life (A-life), one could observe the 
increase in complexity of simulated entities (Ray 2003), but in the same time letting the digital 
environment be causally connected to the achieved levels of complexity of subsystems. In other 
words, not create a simulated ecosystem with somewhat fluctuating parameters describing local 
conditions in order to observe evolution within it, but create a family of ecosystems whose (global) 
rules themselves are subject to change; not random change, but change which would be somehow 
connected to what has happened historically in the simulation so far. In other words, by deploying 
large-scale numerical simulations of evolving systems, we study complexity arising, to use the wise 
formulation of Iris Fry, neither by chance nor by design (Fry 2000; see also contributions to the 
excellent anthology of Lineweaver, Davies, & Ruse 2013). While there is some controversy over the 
epistemic status of numerical simulations in modern science (e.g., Parker 2009; Winsberg 2010), it is 
undoubted that our scientific understanding got enormously strengthened since they became widely 
used with the advent of the “informatic revolution”. Some of the state-of-the-art simulations are 
already achieving unprecedented levels of complexity and are utilized exactly for astrobiological 
purposes (e.g., Vukotid et al. 2016); it is clear, however, that those are only very first, crude steps in 
what is a very broad and long road in front of us. Testing the co-evolutionary hypothesis by numerical 
simulations of evolution of complexity in particular – still necessarily simplified – context offers a 
previously unknown way of making justified inferences from simulation results to conclusions about 
metaphysical “target” systems. Very encouraging steps in this direction have recently been 
undertaken, in particular by the team of Paul C. W. Davies (Pavlic et al. 2014; Adams et al. 2016). 
While there has been long-standing attempts (sometimes a bit tongue-in-cheek) to empirically test 
the Design and the Multiverse hypotheses (e.g., Hsu and Zee 2006), most researchers would 
probably conclude that these are empirically untestable in their strongest versions. Therefore, they 
have been regarded as traditional metaphysical concepts. Such a strong division might have become 
obsolete already, since virtual worlds could now be created and evolved, at least below a particular 
(quickly moving!) threshold of complexity. Application of numerical simulations in studying 
coevolution of the universe and observers would overcome one of the common philosophical 
criticisms raised against numerical experiments, as opposed to the classical experiments, namely that 
numerical experiments by their very design rarely test the basic theory in contrast to establishing 
credibility of hypotheses derived from such a basic theory (Winsberg 2010). Claims about fine tuning 
of the universe can hardly be construed as being derived from a particular physical theory; rather, all 
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theories have to conform to the grounding implications of habitability. It follows that the usage of 
numerical experiments is less constrained in this metaphysico-cosmological narrative than it is in the 
conventional physical and cosmological applications.  
 
5. Discussion 
Explaining fine tunings through coevolution of the physical world and observers is the least studied 
explanatory option in at least three quarters of the century long history of this (meta)problem. 
Insofar we wish to seriously face this issue on the shifting boundary of physics and metaphysics, and 
especially if we wish to resist fruitless and corrosive influence of explanatory nihilism, we would do 
very good to take coevolution seriously and to build models in which its advantages could show. Two 
models sketched above represent only some of the options within the framework of the “third way” 
of coevolution (Davies 2007). Of course, from the discussion above it is clear that a philosophical 
maneuver could be performed in such a way that the endosymbiotic model is connected to the 
multiverse hypothesis, and the model with closed timelike curves is connected to the design 
hypothesis. Although it does not seem particularly interesting or productive, it still shows how small 
is the number of options at our disposal when dealing with the problem of such generality as the 
origin of fine tunings of the observable universe. This circumstance presents in itself another 
argument against explanatory nihilism: we need not take that road yet, since we can indeed 
eliminate all but a few contending theories.  
Finally, as much as in economics or sports, the strength of a player in philosophy depends not just 
only on her intrinsic properties, but also on the strength of her rivals. The Design hypothesis is 
unpopular for the reasons permeating science since the epoch of Enlightenment: it is commonly felt 
that by abandoning naturalism we would lose much and gain nothing substantial in terms of insight. 
In addition, in the concrete case of fine tunings of the universe, the design hypothesis offers only a 
dilluted and weak form of explanation – since we have no insight into the mind or motivation of the 
Designer, we could state that the Designer may create fine-tuned universe, but hardly anything more 
than that. By the same token, the Designer may create the multiverse, or a mechanism of evolving 
universes (e.g., self-reproducing universes inside black holes; cf. Smolin 1997) – or the coevolution 
processes discussed above. Arbitrage between these options seems fruitless since the Designer's 
motivation is inaccessible. In the opposite corner of the ring, although the multiverse hypothesis 
received strong independent support from advances in cosmology and string theory, there are still 
many difficulties; for instance, it could be argued that models of the multiverse considered thus far 
are either too small or too big (Soler Gil & Alfonseca 2013). It is not just the fact that it will be long 
before string theory (in the form of M-theory or any other version) is empirically tested, but also the 
fact of life is that wider explanatory basis usually provide with livelier research activity. This is 
especially true in the interdisciplinary contexts which are still fighting for their legitimacy, as is the 
case with this aspect of “practical metaphysics”. 
Both models of co-evolution considered here contain a dose of something which will undoubtedly be 
characterized as “mysticism”, usually associated with pre-analytical or even pre-Kantian philosophical 
tradition. Alternatively, it could be subsumed into science-fictional speculation in the spirit of, say, 
  
13 
Olaf Stapledon (especially see Stapledon 1937) or Karl Schroeder (2005). As the philosopher Robert 
Nozick best put, however:16  
More than clarifying the issues somewhat, I wish I could resolve the question of whether reality is as 
the mystic describes it. I take the question, and the mystics’ experiences, very seriously, which some 
will think immediately is a great mistake. (But do they think this only because they already assume a 
background theory that discounts the mystics’ experiences; if so, what led them to that theory?) For 
the purposes of philosophical explaining and understanding, we need not resolve the question< it 
suffices to consider, elaborate, and keep track of the hypotheses.  
Today, this could be done, as argued above, by using numerical experiments and simulations. 
Considering the emergence of numerical experiments as the “third kingdom” between empirical and 
theoretical research, they seem most convenient for understanding counterfactual state-of-affairs 
like universes without fine tunings or with different fine tunings and different conditions for 
evolution of complexity. Although there are many quite involved details which need to be tracked 
and elaborated, in the spirit of Nozick’s quote, it does not seem that there are insurmountable 
obstacles for a research programme testing models of coevolution in a correspondingly rich 
parameter space.  
A takeaway for the general philosophy of science could be another important instance of what 
George Ellis calls top-down causation (Ellis et al. 2012; Ellis 2015) and what has become a rather hot 
topic in recent years (e.g., Okasha 2012). The importance of top-down causation as opposed – but 
complementary – to the conventional reductionist bottom-up has been recognized in more and more 
fields, but it is exactly the top-heavy evolutionary processes, like the Darwinian selection, which carry 
the greatest weight in the discussions. The obvious relevance could be found even by choice of 
examples; thus Ellis writes (Ellis 2015, pp. 38-39): 
Top down effects clearly occur when lower level entities cannot exist outside their higher level 
context (again, a common effect in biology, where symbiosis is rife)… bottom up emergence by itself 
is strictly limited in terms of complexity it can give rise to. Emergence of genuine complexity is 
characterised by a reversal of information flow from bottom up to top down. 
Feynman's dramatic idea of understanding the qualitative meaning of the equations of physics, in 
what is arguably one of the most philosophical passages in his opus cited at the beginning of this 
paper, obtains true significance – and ceases to sound so shocking to the orthodox flock – only in this 
context. The very existence of high-level entities, such as frogs, composers, or morality, provides a 
starting point for the constraining flow of information top-down in Ellis' parlance. Their relationship 
with low-level entities becomes less surprising, less outrageous, and ultimately more susceptible to 
scientific understanding than it has been under the one-sided reductionist paradigm.  
In contemporary philosophy of physics one often encounters attempts to “reign in” or even condemn 
allegedly excessive speculation present in contemporary theoretical physics (e.g., Callender 2004; 
Mosterín 2005). Instead of such Quixotian orientation to fighting windmills, perhaps a better way 
would be just the opposite: to accept the recipe which showed to be successful time and again, 
namely to take our best theoretical ideas entirely seriously and to philosophically analyze their 
                                                          
16
 Nozick (1981), p. 164. 
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ultimate consequences. This new form of practical metaphysics, which has some time ago 
fortunately stopped being regarded as oxymoronic, has rich and intriguing future prospects.17  
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